Editor's Introduction |
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ix | |
Preface |
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1 | (4) |
Introduction |
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5 | (22) |
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I. Of the division of Philosophy |
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5 | (2) |
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II. Of the realm of Philosophy in general |
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7 | (2) |
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III. Of the Critique of Judgment as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole |
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9 | (2) |
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IV. Of Judgment as a faculty legislating a priori |
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11 | (2) |
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V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgment |
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13 | (4) |
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VI. Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature |
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17 | (2) |
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VII. Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature |
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19 | (3) |
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VIII. Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature |
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22 | (2) |
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IX. Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgment |
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24 | (3) |
First Part: Critique of the Aesthetical Judgment |
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27 | (126) |
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FIRST DIVISION: Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgment |
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27 | (110) |
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FIRST BOOK: Analytic of the Beautiful |
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27 | (34) |
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First Moment of the judgment of taste, according to quality |
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27 | (6) |
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§1. The judgment of taste is aesthetical |
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27 | (1) |
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§2. The satisfaction which determines the judgment of taste is disinterested |
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28 | (1) |
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§3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest |
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29 | (1) |
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§4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest |
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30 | (2) |
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§5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction |
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32 | (1) |
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Second Moment of the judgment of taste, viz. according to quantity |
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33 | (7) |
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§6. The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction |
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33 | (1) |
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§7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic |
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34 | (1) |
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§8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgment of Taste only as subjective |
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35 | (3) |
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§9. Investigation of the question whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object |
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38 | (2) |
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Third Moment of judgments of taste, according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein |
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40 | (14) |
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§10. Of purposiveness in general |
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40 | (1) |
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§11. The judgment of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) |
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41 | (1) |
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§12. The judgment of taste rests on a priori grounds |
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42 | (1) |
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§13. The pure judgment of taste is independent of charm and emotion |
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43 | (1) |
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§14. Elucidation by means of examples |
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43 | (3) |
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§15. The judgment of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection |
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46 | (2) |
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§16. The judgment of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure |
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48 | (2) |
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§17. Of the Ideal of Beauty |
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50 | (4) |
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Fourth Moment of the judgment of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object |
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54 | (3) |
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§18. What the modality in a judgment of taste is |
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54 | (1) |
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§19. The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgment of taste, is conditioned |
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55 | (1) |
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§20. The condition of necessity which a judgment of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense |
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55 | (1) |
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§21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? |
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56 | (1) |
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§22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense |
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56 | (1) |
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General remark on the first section of the Analytic |
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57 | (4) |
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SECOND BOOK: Analytic of the Sublime |
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61 | (76) |
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§23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime |
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61 | (2) |
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§24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the sublime |
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63 | (1) |
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A. Of the Mathematically Sublime |
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64 | (10) |
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§25. Explanation of the term "sublime" |
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64 | (2) |
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§26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime |
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66 | (5) |
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§27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgments upon the Sublime |
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71 | (3) |
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B. Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature |
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74 | (5) |
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§28. Of Nature regarded as Might |
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74 | (3) |
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§29. Of the modality of the judgment upon the sublime in nature |
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77 | (2) |
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General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgment |
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79 | (11) |
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Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgments |
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90 | (47) |
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§30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgments on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful |
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90 | (1) |
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§31. Of the method of deduction of judgments of Taste |
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91 | (1) |
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§32. First peculiarity of the judgment of Taste |
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92 | (2) |
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§33. Second peculiarity of the judgment of Taste |
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94 | (1) |
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§34. There is no objective principle of Taste possible |
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95 | (1) |
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§35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgment in general |
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96 | (1) |
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§36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgments of Taste |
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97 | (1) |
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§37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgment of Taste |
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98 | (1) |
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§38. Deduction of judgments of Taste |
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98 | (2) |
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§39. Of the communicability of a sensation |
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100 | (1) |
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§40. Of Taste as a kind of sensus communis |
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101 | (2) |
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§41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful |
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103 | (2) |
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§42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful |
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105 | (4) |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (1) |
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§45. Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature |
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111 | (1) |
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§46. Beautiful Art is the art of genius |
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112 | (1) |
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§47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius |
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113 | (2) |
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§48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste |
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115 | (2) |
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§49. Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius |
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117 | (5) |
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§50. Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art |
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122 | (1) |
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§51. Of the division of the beautiful arts |
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123 | (4) |
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§52. Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product |
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127 | (1) |
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§53. Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts |
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128 | (3) |
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131 | (6) |
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SECOND DIVISION: Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment |
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137 | (16) |
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137 | (1) |
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§56. Representation of the antimony of Taste |
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137 | (1) |
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§57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste |
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138 | (6) |
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§58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgment |
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144 | (4) |
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§59. Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality |
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148 | (3) |
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§60. Appendix: Of the method of Taste |
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151 | (2) |
Second Part: Critique of the Teleological Judgment |
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153 | (45) |
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§61. Of the objective purposiveness of Nature |
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153 | (2) |
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FIRST DIVISION: Analytic of the Teleological Judgment |
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155 | (18) |
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§62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material |
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155 | (3) |
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§63. Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature |
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158 | (3) |
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§64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes |
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161 | (2) |
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§65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings |
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163 | (3) |
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§66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings |
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166 | (1) |
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§67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes |
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167 | (3) |
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§68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science |
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170 | (3) |
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SECOND DIVISION: Dialectic of the Teleological Judgment |
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173 | (25) |
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§69. What is an antinomy of the Judgment? |
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173 | (1) |
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§70. Representation of this antinomy |
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174 | (1) |
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§71. Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy |
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175 | (1) |
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§72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of nature |
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176 | (2) |
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§73. None of the above systems give what they pretend |
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178 | (3) |
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§74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable |
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181 | (2) |
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§75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgment |
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183 | (2) |
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185 | (3) |
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§77. Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible |
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188 | (5) |
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§78. Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature |
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193 | (5) |
Appendix: Methodology of the Teleological Judgment |
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198 | (46) |
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§79. Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature |
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198 | (1) |
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§80. Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose |
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199 | (3) |
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§81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product |
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202 | (3) |
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§82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings |
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205 | (4) |
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§83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system |
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209 | (3) |
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§84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself |
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212 | (2) |
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214 | (5) |
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219 | (4) |
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§87. Of the moral proof of the Being of God |
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223 | (4) |
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§88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof |
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227 | (5) |
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§89. Of the use of the moral argument |
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232 | (1) |
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§90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God |
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233 | (5) |
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§91. Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith |
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238 | (6) |
General remarks on Teleology |
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244 | |